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JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION:
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL PRACTICE
S.I. Strong*

A. INTRODUCTION
In the battle for the imagination of the legal community, substantive law has traditionally
prevailed over procedural law. For years, the field of civil procedure has struggled to
overcome the perception that it is either dull (at best) or of secondary importance (at worst).
Furthermore, longstanding beliefs about the intransigence of parochial national procedures
have often thwarted attempts to discuss matters of procedure in the international and
comparative context.
These assumptions have recently been challenged, however. For example, scholars
and practitioners now recognize that “[p]rocedure is an instrument of power that can, in a
very practical sense, generate or undermine substantive rights”.1 Globalization has inspired
an increasing number of cross-border transactions and disputes, leading comparativists to
embrace the notion that “[a]dvocates, advisers, and judges must have at least a working
knowledge of foreign procedures to be able to frame, anticipate, or decide legal issues that
cross national boundaries”.2 As a result, comparative civil procedure has become a
promising new field for both academic and practising lawyers.
Transnational litigation poses a particular problem for multinational actors in that
both lawyers and parties typically expect foreign civil procedure to mirror that of their home
system. The situation is exacerbated when local counsel fails to recognize how unusual a
* PhD (law), University of Cambridge; DPhil, University of Oxford; JD, Duke University. The author, who is
admitted as a solicitor in England and Wales and an attorney in New York and Illinois, is Senior Fellow at the
Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution and Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri.
1

TO Main, “The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law” (2010) 87 Washington University Law Review
801, 802.
2
S Dodson, “Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards” (2010) 158 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 441, 444-45.
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particular practice may be for non-residents and thus neglects to mention the procedure to the
client. The combination of these two factors can lead parties to make major tactical errors
simply as a result of a procedural misunderstanding. More information is therefore needed
about these unusual and often invisible practices so that clients and counsel can make
strategic decisions in full knowledge of the likely ramifications of their actions.
One procedure that needs to be more fully understood at the international level is
jurisdictional discovery, a uniquely American device that combines two of the more
internationally problematic aspects of United States civil procedure, namely an exceptionally
broad view of extraterritorial jurisdiction and an expansive approach to pre-trial discovery.
The mechanism comes into play before the court‟s jurisdiction over the defendant is even
established and allows plaintiffs to ask defendants3 to produce documents and information
that can be used to justify the plaintiff‟s claim that jurisdiction in this court is proper. The
procedure, which has been largely overlooked by commentators both in the United States4
and elsewhere,5 applies equally to all defendants, regardless of their location. Though used
infrequently in the past, jurisdictional discovery against parties based outside the United

3

Jurisdictional discovery is most commonly ordered against putative defendants, but it can be requested of
plaintiffs and third parties as well. This article focuses exclusively on discovery orders directed at named
defendants, since those cases are more frequent and the issues are somewhat different than those concerning
non-parties and plaintiffs. See, eg, Linde v Arab Bank, PLC 262 FRD 136, 145 (EDNY 2009); In re Baycol
Products Litigation 348 F Supp 2d 1058, 1060 (D Minn 2004).
4
See SI Strong, “Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts” (2010) 67 Washington and Lee Law
Review 489, 492-94 (discussing why research has been limited). The few existing scholarly works include J
Anderson, “Toys „R‟ Us, the Third Circuit, and a Standard for Jurisdictional Discovery Involving Internet
Activities” (2003) 9 Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law 471; KM Clermont,
“Jurisdictional Fact” (2006) 91 Cornell Law Review 973; Strong, supra; JEC, Note, “Use of Discovery to Obtain
Jurisdictional Facts” (1973) 59 Virginia Law Review 533. Internationally oriented analysis by US commentators
has been limited to cases involving foreign sovereigns. SR Swanson, “Jurisdictional Discovery Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (1999) 13 Emory International Law Review 445; JM Terry, Comment,
“Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act” (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law
Review 1029.
5
The device has been scarcely discussed outside the US. See, eg, RG Blum, “American courts and foreign
litigants: should American discovery rules apply when a foreigner challenges an American court's jurisdiction?”
(2000) 11 International Company and Commercial Law Review 114; EP Gay, “Obtaining evidence in England:
the role of US counsel” (1997) 5 International Insurance Law Review 249.

2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739293

States is on the rise, leading to confusion and conflicts based on differences in the parties‟
understanding of proper procedural practice.
This article therefore has several aims. First, it attempts to increase awareness of this
exceptional procedural device so that parties based outside the United States can understand
the genesis and role of jurisdictional discovery in US federal practice (section B).6 Second,
the article describes what litigants can expect in terms of the practical application of
jurisdictional discovery (section C). Third, the article discusses the special means by which
multinational actors can avoid or limit jurisdictional discovery, based on recent decisions
from the United States Supreme Court (section D). Finally, the article concludes with
remarks on the future of jurisdictional discovery in the transnational context (section E).

B. THE GENESIS AND ROLE OF JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IN US
FEDERAL COURTS
Like all procedural mechanisms, jurisdictional discovery arose in response to a specific issue,
namely the need for every US federal court to confirm that it has jurisdiction over both the
defendant and the dispute before it makes an adjudication on the merits.7 The concept of
legitimate jurisdiction is nothing new, although every legal system has its own means of
ascertaining and evaluating facts relevant to a jurisdictional determination. Interestingly,
many states demonstrate a heightened concern when they are asked to assert jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant. Thus, for example, several common law systems, including England and
Australia, utilize special service-out proceedings that incorporate various elements that
benefit foreign defendants. These pro-defendant components include reversing the normal
presumption regarding the propriety of the forum, resolving doubts in favour of the foreign

6

Although jurisdictional discovery also takes place in state courts, the discussion focuses solely on US federal
law for reasons of space.
7
Federal courts in the United States have only limited jurisdiction, meaning that plaintiffs must demonstrate that
both the dispute and the defendant fall within certain prescribed boundaries.
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litigant, and requiring claimants to provide full and frank disclosures regarding jurisdictional
claims, including the provision of information that might be detrimental to the claimant‟s
jurisdictional assertions.8 Canada uses a similar system of service out, although Canadian
courts demonstrate some scepticism about the merits of a procedure that relies entirely on
self-disclosure and therefore permit cross-examination of affiants during any hearing on
jurisdiction.9
The situation is very different in the United States. For example, US courts do not
have different procedures for asserting jurisdiction over foreign versus domestic defendants,10
nor does the law impose any presumptions in favour of the non-resident party. Instead, the
US system permits plaintiffs to name whomever they wish as defendants, without any judicial
oversight and subject only to the plaintiffs‟ good faith belief that jurisdiction is proper.11
Furthermore, plaintiffs need not even hold any firm evidence that jurisdiction is warranted
when they file their claim. Instead, they can wait for the defendant to challenge jurisdiction
and then ask the judge for an order of jurisdictional discovery that compels the defendant to
produce documents and information regarding relevant jurisdictional facts, including facts
adverse to the defendant‟s position.
This type of approach demonstrates both a high level of distrust regarding the
possibility of self-serving disclosures on the part of defendants as well as a bias towards
broad access to justice. US courts have expressed concern that other procedures (such as
those used in service out) could force courts to dismiss otherwise legitimate claims simply as

8

See, eg, Civil Procedure Rules (England) [hereinafter CPR] Rs 6.33, 6.36-6.37; Practice Direction 6b, Service
out of the Jurisdiction (England); Federal Court Rules (Australia) Order 8, Rs 2-3; The Hagen [1908] P 189
(England); C Joseph & PS Selvin, “Service of Process Under United States and English Law”, in J Fellas (ed),
Transatlantic Commercial Litigation and Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2004) 37, 56, 72.
9
See OG Chase et al (eds), Civil Litigation in Comparative Context (St Paul, Thomson West, 2007) 522-23.
10
The US uses a slightly different method of service for foreign and domestic defendants, but jurisdiction and
service are not linked to the same extent as they are in England, for example. See Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (US) [hereinafter Fed R Civ P] R 4; Sir Lawrence Collins et al (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on
The Conflict of Laws para 11-003 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 14th edn, 2006).
11
See Fed R Civ P 11(b).
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a result of the defendant‟s withholding information about jurisdictionally relevant facts.12
The problem is that this method of establishing jurisdiction appears to be utterly unique, even
within the common law tradition. Indeed, Australia‟s highest court recently refused a request
for jurisdictional discovery in the context of a service-out proceeding, claiming that the
interests of international comity meant that “a foreign defendant served outside Australia
should not lightly be subjected to the jurisdiction of this Court, but more importantly should
not have imposed upon him one of the Court‟s compulsory processes in aid of establishing
the jurisdiction itself”.13
As exceptional as jurisdictional discovery may be, it makes sense when viewed in its
historic and domestic context. Interestingly, jurisdictional discovery is not mentioned in any
statute or rule of court. Instead, it is an entirely judge-made procedure that is rooted in the
policies and procedures reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were
considered ground-breaking at the time of their adoption in 1938. Indeed, jurisdictional
discovery did not exist in the United States prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules.14
The first reported decision to use the phrase “jurisdictional discovery” was handed
down in 1961 and involved two defendants – one British, one Bermudan – who were
allegedly subject to the jurisdiction of the US court either by virtue of “doing business” in the
forum or as the alter egos of defendants who were indisputably subject to the court‟s
control.15 When the defendants sought to have the case dismissed, the court held that it had
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and the fact that the defendants had not yet been
properly determined to be “parties” did not allow them to avoid discovery procedures that
were analogous to procedures concerning discovery on the merits. Notably, this second

12

See Mother Doe I v Al Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1144 (SD Fla 2007).
Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corp [2007] FCA 1928 para 8.
14
See, eg, Strong, supra n 4, 497-98; JEC, supra n 4, 545.
15
General Industrial Co v Birmingham Sound Reproducers, Ltd 26 FRD 559, 561 (EDNY 1961).
13
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conclusion is precisely opposite to the position taken recently by the Australian Federal
Court.16
Jurisdictional discovery was used sparingly in subsequent years, but the device gained
credibility in 1978 by virtue of the United States Supreme Court‟s opinion in Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc v Sanders.17 There, the Supreme Court cited the seminal decision of Hickman v
Taylor18 for the proposition that relevance in discovery is and should be construed broadly,
stating that:
[c]onsistently with the notice-pleading system established by the [Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure], discovery is not limited to issues raised by the
pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.
Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented
issues may arise during litigation that are not related to the merits.19
Thus, “where issues arise as to jurisdiction or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the
facts bearing on such issues”.20 Subsequent federal cases have all affirmed the principle of
jurisdictional discovery, and today it is universally accepted that “a federal district court has
the power to require a defendant to respond to discovery requests relevant to his or her
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction”.21
Jurisdictional discovery is therefore built on three interrelated concepts. First is the
idea that courts retain the power to determine their own jurisdiction. This tenet is
unremarkable and is reflected in other jurisdictions, including England.22 Second is the
notion of notice pleading, which is somewhat unusual in the world of civil procedure.23

16

See Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corp [2007] FCA 1928 para 8.
437 US 340 (1978).
18
329 US 495, 500-01 (1947).
19
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc v Sanders, 437 US 340, 351 n13 (1978).
20
Ibid.
21
Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 311 (SD Ind 1997).
22
See A Briggs & P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (London, Informa, 5th edn, 2005) 403-04.
23
Fact pleading is said to be more common, though some states‟ interpretation of fact pleading is somewhat lax
and perhaps more akin to US notice pleading. See, eg, CPR Rs 16.2, 16.4; ALI/UNIDROIT, Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 2006) xlviii-xlix; N Andrews, The Modern Civil
Process (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2008) paras 3.04 (describing English “statements of case”( ie, pleadings) and
17
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However, it has been said that pleadings in US cases contain “sufficiently detailed
information that a requirement of „fact pleading‟ can, in fact, be fulfilled”, which suggests
that in practice the US approach is not as different from other jurisdictions as is commonly
believed.24 Third is the conclusion, apparently unique to the United States, that first two
principles, taken together, must necessarily trigger application of discovery regarding the
jurisdictional facts in dispute.

C. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY IN PRACTICE
1. Practical Procedures
Having outlined the genesis and jurisprudential basis for jurisdictional discovery, it is time to
discuss the device‟s practical application. Jurisdictional discovery arises at the beginning of a
lawsuit, very soon after process has been served. A defendant who questions the jurisdiction
of the US court typically responds to service of process in one of three ways:25
First, [a defendant] may ignore the complaint and summons and then, if a
default judgment is issued against her, may challenge the issuing court‟s
jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding (presumably closer to home or other
assets) when the plaintiff seeks to enforce the judgment. Second, she may
voluntarily waive any lack of personal jurisdiction and submit to the distant
court‟s jurisdiction. Third, she may appear in the distant court to assert the
lack of personal jurisdiction. By taking this third route, . . . the defendant
submits herself to the jurisdiction and power of the court for the limited
purpose of deciding the jurisdictional issue. That court‟s decision in the
jurisdictional issue will be res judicata in future proceedings to enforce a
judgment. On this third route, the defendant also submits to the procedures of
the distant court, including discovery, for orderly resolution of the
jurisdictional issue.26
Thus, jurisdictional discovery is typically triggered by the defendant‟s entering a
formal objection to the court‟s jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
noting “[t]here is no need to include . . . any detailed evidence or details of legal argument” in such statements),
3.08.
24
ALI/UNIDROIT, supra n 23, xlix; see also ibid, 7; Dodson, supra n 2, 443, 452.
25
Recent US Supreme Court decisions have suggested other tactical alternatives in a limited number of cases.
See infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
26
Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 311 (SD Ind 1997) (citation omitted).
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Procedure.27 At that point, “the trial court has three procedural alternatives: „it may decide
the motion upon the affidavits alone; it may permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion;
or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions.‟”28 If
jurisdictional discovery is ordered, the party against whom the order is made must comply in
full. Failure to do so can lead to sanctions ranging from the court‟s shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove that jurisdiction does not exist to deeming certain matters to have been
conceded.29 Courts can even go so far as to conclude that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist, so
long as doing so is “fair” and “just” in the circumstances.30 However, defendants do not
simply have to endure burdensome or oppressive discovery orders; should compliance
become unduly difficult, expensive, embarrassing or annoying, a party can seek a protective
order pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although the definition
of burdensomeness is of course viewed from the US legal perspective, which may not be as
favourable as a foreign litigant would like.

2. Legal Standards
Once jurisdictional discovery has been requested, the court must consider two related
questions: (1) whether jurisdictional discovery ought to be ordered and (2) what the scope of
such discovery is to be, if such an order is made. These issues are covered separately below.

(a) Availability of jurisdictional discovery
United States federal courts agree that that “[t]he party seeking [jurisdictional] discovery
bears the burden of showing its necessity” as well as the ultimate burden of demonstrating

27

A federal district court may also raise questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, although
such a move would be unusual. See Grupo Dataflux v Atlas Global Group, LP 541 US 567, 593 (2004).
28
Hagen v U-Haul of Tennessee 613 F Supp 2d 986, 1002 n10 (WD Tenn 2009) (citation omitted).
29
See Fed R Civ P 37; Saudi v Marine Atlantic, Ltd 306 Fed Appx 653, 654 (2d Cir 2009).
30
Insurance Corp of Ireland, Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee 456 US 694, 709 (1982).
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that the jurisdiction of the court is proper.31 Beyond that, little is consistent in this area of
law. For example, there is no national consensus regarding the circumstances in which
jurisdictional discovery will be granted,32 despite the claim that matters of procedure are
supposed to be uniform across the nation.33 To some extent, the disparity arises because
matters of discovery reside firmly within the discretion of trial court judges, but the
disinclination of the US Supreme Court to provide guidance at the national level has proven
problematic as well.34
Although standards vary widely regarding the availability of jurisdictional discovery,
many courts focus on whether a prima facie showing of jurisdiction has been made.35
However, a number of jurisdictions do not even require that minimal showing to be met.36
For example, some courts simply look for “a colorable claim of jurisdiction”,37 while other
courts have stated that so long as the plaintiff‟s claims regarding personal jurisdiction are not
“clearly frivolous”, the judge “should ordinarily allow discovery on jurisdiction in order to
aid the plaintiff” in discharging its burden of proof in establishing jurisdiction.38 Even more
lenient are courts that state that “[d]iscovery may be appropriately granted [even] where

31

Maersk, Inc v Neewra, Inc 554 F Supp 2d 424, 440 (SDNY 2008); see also Freeman v United States 556 F 3d
326 (5th Cir 2009); CA Wright & AR Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (St Paul, Thomson West, 3d edn,
2010) s 1067.6.
32
See, eg, Klein v Freedom Strategic Partners, LL, 595 F Supp 2d 1152, 1160 (D Nev 2009); Mother Doe I v Al
Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1144-45 (SD Fla 2007); Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 312 (SD Ind
1997).
33
Fed R Civ P 26, cmt 2000 amend.
34
Review of issues involving jurisdictional discovery has been sought, but denied, on two separate occasions in
the last five years. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lowery v Alabama Power Co, 483 F 3d 1994 (11th Cir
2007), cert denied sub nom Hanna Steel Corp v Lowery 128 S Ct 2877 (2008); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Dever v Hentzen Coatings, Inc 380 F 3d 1070 (8th Cir 2004), cert denied, 543 US 1147 (2005).
35
See Strong, supra n 4, 524-32 (discussing various standards).
36
See GTE New Media Services, Inc v BellSouth Corp 199 F 3d 1343, 1352 (DC Cir 2000); Mother Doe I v Al
Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1144-45 (SD Fla 2007); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 94 F Supp 2d 26, 35
(DDC 2000).
37
Hollins v US Tennis Association 469 F Supp 2d 67, 70 (EDNY 2006).
38
Regan v Loewenstein 292 Fed Appx 200, 205 (3d Cir 2008); see also Metcalfe v Renaissance Marine, Inc 566
F 3d 324, 330, 336 (3d Cir 2009).
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pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted”.39 These standards
are very liberal, and indeed many courts speak of a “qualified right” to jurisdictional
discovery.40
The availability of jurisdictional discovery may vary somewhat according to the
relationship between the parties. For example, “where the facts necessary to establish
personal jurisdiction . . . lie exclusively within the defendant‟s knowledge”, discovery will
typically be permitted.41 Jurisdictional discovery may thus be “particularly appropriate where
the defendant is a corporation”, since the plaintiff – as a “total stranger” to the defendant –
“should not be required . . . to try such an issue [ie, jurisdiction] on affidavits without the
benefit of full discovery”.42 However, “[i]n cases based on alleged contracts between the
parties, it would be an unusual case where the plaintiff should need discovery to show
specific jurisdiction linking the defendant and the controversy to the forum”, since the
plaintiff should already be in possession of the necessary facts.43
Regardless of their precise formulations, all of these standards are very plaintifffriendly, and at first blush it would seem unlikely that a request for jurisdictional discovery
would ever be denied. However, “a court cannot permit discovery as a matter of course
simply because a plaintiff has named a particular party as a defendant”.44 Thus, a request for
discovery that is “based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally
relevant facts” may be properly denied,45 since jurisdictional discovery “is intended to

39

Boschetto v Hansing 539 F 3d 1011, 1011 (9th Cir 2008); see also Blair v City of Worcester 522 F 3d 105, 111
(1st Cir 2008) (supporting discovery in cases of “plausible factual disagreement or ambiguity”); Klein v
Freedom Strategic Partners, LLC 595 F Supp 2d 1152, 1160 (D Nev 2009).
40
Eaton v Dorchester Dev, Inc 692 F 2d 727, 729 n7 (11th Cir 1982); Williamson v Tucker 645 F 2d 404, 414
th
(5 Cir 1981); Blanco v Carigulf Lines 632 F 2d 656 (5th Cir 1980); Chatham Condominium Associations v
Century Village, Inc 597 F 2d 1002, 1012 (5th Cir 1979); Mother Doe I v Al Maktoum 632 F Supp 2d 1130, 1145
(SD Fla 2007).
41
Hollins v US Tennis Association 469 F Supp 2d 67, 71 (EDNY 2006).
42
Metcalfe v Renaissance Marine, Inc 566 F 3d 324, 330, 336 (3d Cir 2009).
43
Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 312 (SD Ind 1997).
44
Hansen v Neumueller 163 FRD 471, 475 (D Del 1995).
45
Boschetto v Hansing 539 F 3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir 2008).
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supplement, not substitute for, initial jurisdictional allegations”.46 Similarly, a claim of
jurisdiction that appears to be both “attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of
specific denials made by defendants” will not suffice to support an order of jurisdictional
discovery, at least where there has been no showing that further discovery would assist in
demonstrating that jurisdiction existed.47 Nevertheless, the general rule appears to be that
jurisdictional discovery will be ordered in all but the most extreme cases, and defendants
should assume that such discovery is far more likely to be ordered than not.

(b) Scope of jurisdictional discovery
Once jurisdictional discovery has been ordered, courts still must decide its scope, ostensibly
“tak[ing] care to ensure that litigation of the jurisdictional issue does not undermine the
purposes of personal jurisdiction law in the first place”.48 It is often said that jurisdictional
discovery is to be “narrowly tailored” and “limited” to jurisdictional issues49 and that
discovery requests must be shaped so as to be likely to produce information relevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry.50
Straightforward as these guidelines may seem in theory, in fact they do very little to
constrain what turns out to be relatively broad discovery orders. The reason why
jurisdictional discovery cannot be easily contained relates to the law regarding federal
jurisdiction, which has become increasingly complex and fact-intensive over the last thirty
years, both with respect to jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the dispute. Because neither the parties nor the courts know in advance precisely
what combination of facts will tip the balance in one direction or the other, plaintiffs often
46

Doe I v State of Israel 400 F Supp 2d 86, 121-22 (DDC 2005).
Autogenomics, Inc v Oxford Gene Technology Ltd 566 F 3d 1020, 1023 (Fed Cir 2009).
48
Ellis v Fortune Seas, Ltd 175 FRD 308, 312 (SD Ind 1997).
49
See, eg, Toys “R” Us, Inc. v Step Two, SA 318 F 3d 446, 448 (3d Cir 2006); Nationwide Mutual Ins Society v
Tryg Int’l Ins Co 91 F 3d 790, 792 (6th Cir 1996).
50
See, eg, Freeman v United States 556 F 3d 326, 342 (5th Cir 2009).
47
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seek production of a great deal of information so as to ensure themselves of a favourable
outcome.
Interestingly, these kinds of broad requests for production of documents and
information were not the norm when jurisdictional discovery was first developed during the
1960s and 1970s. Instead, jurisdictional discovery quite probably was a narrow, limited
inquiry into a few relevant facts. However, two key developments irrevocably altered the
scope of the device. First, the types of disputes that appeared in federal court changed
radically between 1938 and the late twentieth century, moving from small, local matters to
large, complicated, inter-state or international disputes that involved more controversial
jurisdictional claims.51 Second, most of the key judicial opinions regarding federal
jurisdiction arose after the 1978 decision in Oppenheimer that legitimized jurisdictional
discovery as a procedural device in US federal courts.52 Because the Supreme Court has not
yet dealt with the question of what constitutes “limited” jurisdictional discovery in the
contemporary context, lower federal courts have been left to fend for themselves in deciding
how best to meld the pro-plaintiff, pro-discovery presumptions embodied in the law
concerning jurisdictional discovery with increasingly expansive definitions of jurisdictionally
relevant facts. District court judges have therefore not been given any theoretical principles
that would allow a more restrictive approach and have thus tended to allow discovery of any
information that might possibly be relevant to the question of jurisdiction. As a result,
jurisdictional discovery has become extremely wide-ranging, despite the claim that the device
is – or should be – limited in scope.
For many people, the primary problem with jurisdictional discovery relates to the
time, cost and effort involved in producing large amounts of documents and information
51

Strong, supra n 4, 504.
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc v Sanders 437 US 340, 351 n13 (1978). Only one major case on federal jurisdiction
predates Oppenheimer. See International Shoe Co v Washington 326 US 310 (1945) (creating the minimum
contacts test for personal jurisdiction).
52
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before the jurisdiction of the court is even established.53 Although that is indeed disturbing,
the device can also lead to other concerns. Issues arise with respect to inquiries regarding
both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, as discussed below.

Personal jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction in US federal courts depends on two types of authority, one legislative
and one constitutional. Both must be present for a federal court to assert jurisdiction over a
defendant‟s person or property.
Legislative authority can take one of three forms. First, federal courts can rely on a
long-arm statute54 enacted by the state in which the court sits and “adopt” it into use through
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, courts can, pursuant to
Rule 4(k)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, invoke any jurisdictional grants
contained in any substantive federal law on which the plaintiff relies. Third, courts faced
with defendants from outside the United States can look to Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which creates a type of federal long-arm statute in certain federal question
cases. All three types of jurisdiction are relied upon regularly in practice.
Perhaps the most striking problem with jurisdictional discovery in the context of
federal courts‟ legislative authority involves state long-arm statutes, particularly those that
enumerate the specific activities that permit personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In some

53

Space limitations prohibit the reproduction of actual requests for jurisdictional discovery, but the amount of
information sought can be extensive. See Strong, supra n 4, 535-57 (containing actual discovery requests filed
in US federal court).
54
State long-arm statutes describe the jurisdictional reach of a particular state court and typically adopt one of
two approaches: (1) an expansive view that permits jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the US
Constitution (or sometimes both the US Constitution and the state constitution) or (2) a narrower view that lists
the specific circumstances in which personal jurisdiction may be asserted. See, eg, California Civil Procedure
Code s 410.10 (2006) (extending jurisdiction to the full extent of state and federal constitutional limits); New
York Civil Practice Law s 302 (2006) (using the enumerated grounds approach); Utah Code Annotated s 78B-3201 (2008) (extending jurisdiction to the full extent of the federal constitution).
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instances, these statutes require federal courts to undertake complex, fact-specific
jurisdictional analyses that mimic the type of inquiries that must be made on the merits.55
For example, some state long-arm statutes assert jurisdiction over defendants based on
principles of agency or corporate law. Thus, jurisdictional discovery might be sought in a US
federal court regarding the existence or scope of an agency relationship or regarding the
extent to which an affiliate acted as the alter ego of another corporate entity.56 However,
these issues are not only quite broad, giving rise to extensive (and expensive) discovery, they
also go to the defendant‟s liability on the merits.57 As such, the defendant is burdened by
having to consider merits-based arguments even in advance of any determination on
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the plaintiff receives the benefit of early discovery of the
defendant‟s documents and information at a stage when the defendant is not in a position to
request similar discovery in return, lest such requests negate the jurisdictional objection.
Another problematic type of federal jurisdiction based on legislative authority
involves allegations of a conspiracy involving the defendant. “Conspiracy jurisdiction” –
which can be based on state long-arm statutes made applicable in federal court through Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or on a jurisdiction-granting federal statute such as
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)58 – is in some ways even
more troubling than jurisdiction based on agency or corporate law, since the ties between the
parties and the forum are even more attenuated and nuanced than in cases involving corporate
or agency relationships (and thus more difficult to establish through limited discovery).59

55

RC Casad & WB Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions: Territorial Basis and Process Limitations on
Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts (London, Butterworths Legal Publishers, 3d edn, 1998) 14-15; see also
Eaton v Dorchester Dev, Inc 692 F 2d 727, 733 (11th Cir 1982).
56
See, eg, Anderson v Dassault Aviation 361 F 3d 449, 452-55 (8th Cir 2004); Doe v Unocal 248 F 3d 915, 92531 (9th Cir 2001).
57
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Furthermore, conspiracy jurisdiction reflects the same problems as jurisdiction based on
theories involving agency or corporate liability, in that it involves early disclosure of
numerous facts that are intimately associated with liability on the merits.60 Conspiracy
jurisdiction also gives rise to various jurisprudential issues that are beyond the scope of this
article, including the impropriety of attributing the jurisdictional contacts of one defendant to
another.61
Difficulties with federal grants of jurisdiction can also arise when foreign sovereigns
claim immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).62 As a
federal statute containing legislative authority to grant jurisdiction in US federal courts, the
FSIA is somewhat unique, in that it links “subject matter and personal jurisdictional questions
. . . with immunity questions” and grants foreign states and instrumentalities immunity from
suit unless one of several exceptions apply.63 The problem is that the information that denies
the court jurisdiction is typically the same that grants substantive immunity. Thus, FSIA
cases – like agency, alter ego and conspiracy cases – result in jurisdictional discovery that
overlaps with merits discovery. Cases arising under the FSIA also experience problems
because of the “tension between permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions to statutory
foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign‟s or sovereign agency‟s legitimate
claim to immunity from discovery”.64 Courts have only “rarely explain[ed] how to conduct
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or manage limited discovery to determine jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns” and have
instead resorted to the simple platitude that discovery should be “narrow” or “limited”.65
All of these examples reflect situations where jurisdictional discovery will likely be
considered highly appropriate, since the relevant facts are typically in the exclusive control of
the defendant. Furthermore, these examples demonstrate how challenging it can be for courts
to craft a narrow discovery order concerning jurisdiction, particularly when jurisdictional and
merits issues overlap. In some cases, courts have given up on the task altogether and have
instead permitted plaintiffs to address jurisdictional issues as part of discovery on the merits
rather than try to issue a suitably limited jurisdictional discovery order.66 This, of course, has
the effect of putting the defendant through the burden of broad discovery before the question
of jurisdiction is even settled, an approach that violates “the very right the jurisdictional basis
requirements are designed to protect: the right not to have to litigate that case in that
forum”.67
The problems do not end there, however. Legislative authority for federal jurisdiction
over the person is only one part of the analysis. Federal courts must also undertake a
constitutional inquiry into the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant.68 The
central inquiry here is one of fairness, which “recognizes both the practical expenses and
burdens of subjecting a party to a lawsuit in a distant court”.69 Although the fundamental test
regarding the constitutional limits of US federal courts was enunciated in 1945 in
International Shoe v Washington (ie, the “minimum contacts” test),70 no one thought at the
time to consider the decision‟s impact on jurisdictional discovery, quite possibly for the
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simple reason that at that time jurisdictional discovery had not even begun to develop.
Furthermore, when jurisdictional discovery began to achieve some legitimacy in the late
1970s,71 courts and commentators failed to consider how a purposefully vague and highly
fact-specific constitutional analysis72 would affect jurisdictional discovery. Although that
was, in retrospect, a bit of an oversight, it is also true that the more complex constitutional
tests for jurisdiction had not yet been developed; that would not happen until the 1980s, with
a string of cases beginning with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson.73
These cases have made the constitutional test for jurisdiction increasingly complicated
and difficult to apply. Some attempts at clarification have been made, primarily through the
differentiation between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, where “general
jurisdiction” looks at whether the defendant has established some sort of “presence” in the
forum through “continuous and systematic” business activity within the relevant territory and
“specific jurisdiction” looks at claims that “arise out of” or “relate to” a defendant‟s activity
in that forum,74 but the ability to argue both jurisdictional grounds in the alternative means
that defendants often need to produce information regarding both types of jurisdiction.75
As a result, the current constitutional analysis regarding the propriety of federal
jurisdiction involves a multi-factor, fact-specific inquiry that provides little or no guidance as
to what information is determinative or even most persuasive.76 Because the United States
71
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Supreme Court has indicated that “even a single act can support jurisdiction”, many district
courts are loath to limit jurisdictional discovery on constitutional issues.77 Furthermore, even
if the parameters of the minimum contacts test itself could be discerned and narrowed, the
analysis – and the realm of discoverable facts – would nevertheless be subsequently
expanded by the need for courts to determine that the exercise of jurisdiction is “reasonable”
through the use of various “gestalt factors”.78
Thus, the constitutional tests regarding the outer limits of US federal courts‟
jurisdiction has become a leading cause for jurisdictional discovery that extends far beyond
any sort of limited inquiry that might have initially been contemplated by those who first
developed the device in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the courts‟ constitutional
inquiries are not limited to the realm of personal jurisdiction alone. Cases that proceed in
rem and quasi-in rem may need to undertake the same kind of constitutional analyses before
asserting jurisdiction over the relevant property.79

Subject matter jurisdiction
Parties proceeding in US federal courts must do more than establish jurisdiction over the
defendant. They must also demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a dispute by showing that the claim arises under either US federal or constitutional law.80
One of the most common types of federal disputes involves “diversity jurisdiction”,
which requires both (1) diversity of citizenship (such as that between a citizen of a US state
77
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and a foreign party) and (2) more than $75,000 in dispute.81 Diversity cases can give rise to
several types of jurisdictional discovery. For example, information may be sought to confirm
that the jurisdictional minimum exists.82 Although some calculations (such as those
involving the computation of lost wages in a claim for wrongful termination) are merely
mathematical and would not require jurisdictional discovery, others involve more complex
issues of fact. For example, a plaintiff might seek discovery to demonstrate that the
defendant engaged in “„malicious, willful or outrageous‟ conduct” that would support an
award of treble damages, since those damages could be used to help meet the jurisdictional
minimum.83 Unfortunately, this creates the same sorts of problems that were discussed
earlier with respect to personal jurisdiction arising under certain state long-arm statutes,
where jurisdictional discovery mirrored merits-based discovery.84
Discovery can also be sought regarding other aspects of diversity jurisdiction. For
example, courts may need to determine whether a corporate or other juridical person is a
“citizen” of a particular state or nation.85 The current test for corporate citizenship states that
a corporation will be deemed to be a citizen of the place where it has its “nerve center”,
meaning “the actual center of direction, control, and coordination”.86 Although there may be
times when locating a corporation‟s “nerve center” is relatively simple, the Supreme Court
has recently recognized that there will also be hard cases that require jurisdictional
discovery.87
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Finally, jurisdictional discovery may be sought regarding aspects of federal subject
matter outside the diversity context. For example, discovery may be requested to determine
whether a claim falls under a particular federal statute.88 Again, this type of discovery may
not only be burdensome, it may also mirror the kind of discovery that is required on the
merits.

(c) International issues
As indicated previously, United States is unlike other common law jurisdictions in that it
does not invoke special procedures (such as service out) to assert jurisdiction over foreign
defendants. On one level, therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that US federal courts order
jurisdictional discovery equally against all defendants, regardless of the location of the party
against whom the order is directed.89 Indeed, this is consistent with the general tendency of
US courts to rely on domestic law and policy to decide legal issues rather than looking to
international or comparative legal principles.90 On another level, however, it appears
somewhat incongruous for US federal courts to order jurisdictional discovery against foreign
parties in the same manner as they do against domestic parties, given that the United States is
a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters (Hague Convention).91
The Hague Convention aims “to improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil or
commercial matters” by providing “methods to reconcile the differing legal philosophies” of
various nations and establishing means of obtaining evidence that “satisfy doctrines of legal
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sovereignty”.92 Unsurprisingly, the procedures set forth by the Hague Convention differ
significantly from those used by US federal courts pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, providing a more certain but more restrictive means of obtaining evidence located
abroad. In the years immediately following the United States‟ accession to the Hague
Convention, many US litigants took the view that they should be able to invoke the more
liberal mechanisms outlined in the Federal Rules, regardless of the provisions outlined in the
Hague Convention. Some but not all US courts accepted that approach, and a conflict arose
in the lower federal courts regarding the applicability and scope of the Hague Convention. In
1987, the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider the use of the Hague Convention
in cases involving merits discovery (but not jurisdictional discovery) in Société Nationale
Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States District Court.93
After considering several possible interpretations of the Hague Convention and the
ramifications that would ensue from each of them, the Supreme Court held that the
Convention is nothing more than an optional or “permissive supplement, not a pre-emptive
replacement, for other means of obtaining evidence located abroad”.94 In other words,
although procedures under the Hague Convention “are available whenever they will facilitate
the gathering of evidence by the means authorized in the Convention”, they are only “one
method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ”.95 Furthermore, there is no
rule that “would require first resort to Convention procedures whenever discovery is sought
from a foreign litigant”.96 Thus, US courts may rely solely on the procedures outlined in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even when discovery is sought of a litigant located abroad.
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The US approach did not meet with international approval: much to the contrary.
Indeed, a Special Commission of the Hague Conference concluded shortly after the decision
in Aérospatiale that while views may vary internationally as to whether the Hague
Convention “occupie[s] the field and therefore exclude[s] application of domestic procedural
rules” (ie, whether the Convention is the only possible means by which evidence may be
sought transnationally), “the Commission thought that in all Contracting States, whatever
their views as to its exclusive application, priority should be given to the procedures offered
by the Convention when evidence located abroad is being sought”.97 Notably, the United
States has not altered its approach, despite the Special Commission‟s report.
Although the applicability and scope of the Hague Convention has been severely
curtailed in the United States as a result of Aérospatiale, the Convention still plays a role in
US transnational litigation, primarily in cases involving discovery of non-litigants who are
not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In those instances, use of the Hague
Convention is typically required.98 Given this line of precedent, one might think that
recourse to the Hague Convention would or should be required for jurisdictional discovery,
since that process takes place before the court has determined that jurisdiction over the
defendant is proper. As such, these putative defendants could be viewed as more akin to nonlitigants than to parties to the litigation. That, however, is not the case. Instead, federal
courts have consistently followed Aérospatiale, concluding that the Hague Convention is
merely permissive in cases involving jurisdictional discovery orders directed towards named
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defendants located abroad.99 Furthermore, although parties have argued “that a rule of firstresort [to the Hague Convention] is more important for jurisdictional discovery than for
merits discovery because the comity interests of the foreign nations are higher before
defendants are conclusively found to be subject to the Court‟s jurisdiction”, most US courts
have not adopted that view.100 Instead, Aérospatiale applies in full force to questions of
jurisdictional discovery, and parties based outside of the United States can expect
jurisdictional discovery orders to be issued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
precisely the same way as in purely domestic cases, applying the same procedures, the same
standards as to availability and the same determinations as to scope.101
As frustrating as Aérospatiale may be to foreign parties, the practical effect of the
decision is diminished as a result of article 23 of the Hague Convention. That provision
allows state signatories to indicate that they will not comply with Convention procedures in
cases involving pre-trial discovery. The vast majority of state signatories have made a
reservation under article 23, which has the effect of foreclosing numerous US discovery
attempts – including jurisdictional discovery requests – that would be unobjectionable under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.102 Thus, even if the United States applied the rule of
first resort that was proposed by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference, foreign
litigants would still be subject to jurisdictional discovery orders under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as a secondary measure. The only way a different result would ensue is if the
United States adopted the view that the Hague Convention constituted the sole and exclusive
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means of obtaining evidence from a foreign litigant. Notably, that approach has not won
worldwide adherence and is unlikely to be adopted by the United States.
Therefore, foreign parties who oppose jurisdictional discovery will likely obtain little
relief by challenging Aérospatiale. Instead, they would do better to attack jurisdictional
discovery under principles of domestic law103 – something that has, interestingly, become
more of an option due to several recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court.

D. FOREIGN PARTIES‟ ABILITY TO LIMIT OR AVOID JURISDICTIONAL
DISCOVERY
In the past, parties on the receiving end of an order for jurisdictional discovery have had very
few tactical alternatives available to them.104 However, recent US Supreme Court precedent
may offer some relief to foreign parties named as defendants in US federal court. Two
possible solutions exist. The first is more of a stop-gap measure, providing only intermittent
assistance on a case-by-case basis, whereas the second may provide a long-term answer to the
problem of jurisdictional discovery of foreign litigants.
The first solution arises out of Sinochem International Co v Malaysia International
Shipping Corp, which considered whether federal courts that are faced with several different
motions to dismiss have to decide those motions in any particular order.105 In particular, the
issue was whether courts first have to establish that they have both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over a party before they can dismiss the case as a matter of discretion
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.106 In that case, the Supreme Court held that:
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[i]f . . . a court can readily determine that it lacks jurisdiction over the cause or
the defendant, the proper course would be to dismiss on that ground. In the
mine run of cases, jurisdiction “will involve no arduous inquiry” and both
judicial economy and the consideration ordinarily accorded the plaintiff‟s
choice of forum “should impel the federal court to dispose of [those] issue[s]
first.” But where subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to
determine, and forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of
dismissal, the court properly takes the less burdensome course.107
Thus, “there is no mandatory „sequencing of jurisdictional issues‟”, and “[a] district court . . .
may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness and
judicial economy so warrant”.108
Notably, only non-US defendants can assert a claim of forum non conveniens;
domestic defendants seeking similar results must make a motion to change venue under
section 1404(a) of title 28 of the United States Code. Sinochem therefore provides non-US
parties with some tactical means of avoiding or minimizing jurisdictional discovery.109
Although some questions still remain open – for example, whether a court that wishes to
attach a condition to the dismissal of a case pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens
can do so absent an authoritative ruling on jurisdiction110 – Sinochem nevertheless provides
individual litigants with some means of avoiding burdensome jurisdictional discovery.
As useful and welcome as Sinochem may be, it is only a limited solution available to
foreign defendants on a case-by-case basis. A more widely applicable method of resolving
the issue might arise out of a different line of Supreme Court decisions regarding the pleading
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standards necessary to overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.111
These cases focus on the identification of the amount and type of factual matter that must be
pled under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to withstand a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules. On its
face, Rule 8(a)(2) is quite straightforward, stating simply that the complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”.
However, the Supreme Court recently stated in Ashcroft v Iqbal that this language results in
the imposition of the “plausibility standard”, which indicates that:
[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. 112
This line of cases does more that assert a new and arguably heightened standard for motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. First, the decisions openly challenge “the effectiveness
of judicial discretion in managing litigation problems during the pre-trial phase”.113 Since
jurisdictional discovery is a highly discretionary pre-trial device, this criticism can be
interpreted as applying to both jurisdictional discovery as well as discovery on the merits.
Indeed, two of the Supreme Court cases explicitly addressed the problems of pre-merits
discovery and refused to countenance a phased system of discovery that would rely on careful
judicial management to avoid discovery abuse.114 Instead, the plaintiffs were forced to
defend the motion to dismiss on the evidence that they had in hand.
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Second, “[t]he problem of jurisdictional discovery . . . is closely related to the
decreased emphasis on the pleadings and the corresponding ascension of the role of pre-trial
discovery”.115 Thus, any alteration to US pleadings standards will likely have an inverse
effect on jurisdictional discovery. For example, imposing heightened pleading requirements
would appear to diminish or eliminate the need for jurisdictional discovery and could
possibly result in a procedure that resembled service out proceedings, either with or without
the right of cross-examination.116
Third, the language of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is very
similar to that of Rule 8(a)(1), which states that a pleading must contain “a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court‟s jurisdiction depends”. Although Rule
8(a)(1) has been said not to apply to facts regarding personal jurisdiction,117 it does appear to
apply to other jurisdictional issues, including subject matter jurisdiction.118
The Iqbal line of cases therefore suggests that the problem of jurisdictional discovery
could be solved by extending the Supreme Court‟s newly enunciated “plausibility standard”
to questions of jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the dispute.119 Indeed, one
federal circuit court appears to have already made a move in that direction, stating that:
[t]he plausibility standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is,
of course, distinct from the prima facie showing required to defeat a Rule
12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction . . . . However,
because our inquiries into the personal involvement necessary to pierce
qualified immunity and establish personal jurisdiction are unavoidably
“intertwin[ed],” . . . we now consider whether in light of the considerations set
forth in Iqbal’s qualified immunity analysis, Arar has made a prima facie
showing that personal jurisdiction exists.120
115
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Although federal courts have begun to apply Iqbal and its predecessors to pending disputes,
the United States Congress has expressed discontent with these judicial developments and has
moved to eliminate the advances made by the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the plausibility
standard.121 However, none of these legislative efforts has yet been successful, and it is
unlikely that such proposals will be enacted.
The author has suggested elsewhere that the plausibility standard could usefully be
extended to jurisdictional questions in the context of purely domestic disputes.122 Notably, a
shift in that direction would benefit foreign litigants as much as it did domestic defendants,
since US courts do not treat parties differently based on their location. Nevertheless, it is by
no means certain that US courts or legislators will decide to extend Iqbal to jurisdictional
questions in the context of domestic disputes. That conclusion need not be fatal to the
interests of foreign litigants, however, since the United States could embrace a more limited
type of change by adopting the plausibility standard in transnational proceedings alone.
Such a move would not be uncontroversial. Indeed, some commentators have argued
against the creation of different procedural rules for cross-border litigation, claiming that
such a regime would unfairly burden individuals and small businesses.123 However, there are
at least two reasons why this sort of procedural shift may make sense in the context of the
limited question of jurisdiction.
First, numerous nations already distinguish between methods of asserting jurisdiction
over domestic and international defendants, and adopting a similar approach would put the
United States well into the mainstream of international civil procedure. Furthermore, the
United States could justify such a shift based on its existing jurisprudence. For example,
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states that use special procedures for asserting jurisdiction over foreign parties typically do so
out of respect for the rights of foreign litigants and the interests of international comity.124
Both of those concepts are already reflected in current US law. Indeed, the US Supreme
Court itself has stated that:
American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise special
vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or
unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position.
. . . In addition, we have long recognized the demands of comity in suits
involving foreign states, either as parties or as sovereigns with a coordinate
interest in the litigation.125
Second, the international legal community – led by the American Law Institute (ALI)
and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) – has recently
come out in support of a bifurcated approach to civil procedure. In 2006, the two
organizations published the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure,
which “are intended to help reduce the impact of differences between legal systems in
lawsuits” involving transnational commercial disputes.126 Although the Principles do not
explicitly outline the methods by which jurisdiction may be established and thus may not
seem entirely relevant to the current discussion,127 the fact that the ALI – one of the United
States‟ leading voices in legal policymaking – has come out in favour of specialized
procedures for transnational disputes suggests that US courts or legislators might eventually
consider moving toward the creation of specialized transnational civil procedures, either on a
limited or wholesale basis.

E. CONCLUSION
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It has been said that lawyers “tend to overlook their own countries‟ excesses”,128 and
nowhere is this more true than with jurisdictional discovery. Within the United States, the
device is seen as part of the natural legal order – somewhat costly and time-consuming, but
nevertheless a necessary part of the process of establishing a court‟s jurisdiction over a
person or dispute. It is only when the procedure is brought into the international realm that
its truly exceptional nature becomes apparent. Not only does the mechanism combine two of
the most internationally criticized aspects of US civil procedure – broad discovery and an
expansive concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction – it also requires defendants to submit to
potentially burdensome and intrusive procedures before the court has even determined that it
has jurisdiction. Furthermore, foreign litigants are given no special protections in United
States federal courts, although the recent US Supreme Court decision in Sinochem may
provide some non-resident defendants with a limited amount of relief from jurisdictional
discovery by allowing an alternative means (forum non conveniens) of obtaining dismissal of
the claim.
The future of jurisdictional discovery in transnational litigation is somewhat unclear,
but there are possible signs of change. For example, efforts have been made recently to bring
issues relating to jurisdictional discovery to the attention of the United States Supreme
Court.129 Even if the Supreme Court chooses not to address jurisdictional discovery directly,
the recent decision in Iqbal provides the means for bringing the US more into line with
international standards regarding pleadings, which could affect jurisdictional discovery as
well. Merits-based discovery abuse has been legislatively addressed in recent years, and it
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may be that jurisdictional discovery will soon catch the attention of the relevant authorities.130
Finally, the ALI‟s involvement in the development of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure may signal a willingness within the United States to consider
the development of specialized procedural rules for cross-border disputes.
Despite these intimations of change, there are no immediate proposals on the table
that would affect the availability or scope of jurisdictional discovery in transnational
litigation. That is not to say that the international legal community should not keep abreast of
the issue. Indeed, it is vitally important that the international perspective is heard during any
reform efforts, lest the more exceptional aspects of jurisdictional discovery be perpetuated
simply due to a failure within the United States to understand how unusual this device is.131
Furthermore, those involved in cross-border litigation have an incentive to follow US legal
developments, given that any alteration of US domestic practices will affect transnational
proceedings to an equal degree, at least under current law and practice.
Although reform would be welcome in this area of law, there is much that the
international bar can and should do even before such changes are proposed. First and
foremost, lawyers engaged in advising multinational actors need to educate themselves about
jurisdictional discovery so as to better prepare their clients for the possibility – or even
probability – that such an order may be made. In law, the biggest danger is when “you don‟t
know what you don‟t know”, and nowhere is that more true than with questions of procedure,
since a single ill-advised procedural decision can have major and irrevocable repercussions.
The second most important thing for international counsel to do follows naturally
from the first. Once they have information about jurisdictional discovery in transnational
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litigation in hand, lawyers acting for non-US parties need to consider whether the strategic
options traditionally offered to clients are indeed the best, given the easy availability of
jurisdictional discovery. For example, advocates typically take the view that non-appearance
in a foreign lawsuit is a risky endeavour, only to be adopted in the most extreme
circumstances. Even if jurisdiction is, in a defendant‟s mind, clearly not proper, most parties
will make a limited appearance so as to obtain a definitive ruling. If, however, entering a
limited appearance may and likely will subject a party to a broad order for jurisdictional
discovery, a savvy lawyer might conclude that the risks associated with a default judgment
are less than those associated with jurisdictional discovery. This might be particularly true if
the jurisdictional claims are marginal at best and jurisdictional discovery would require the
production of sensitive or confidential information or would mirror the type of disclosures
normally associated with discovery on the merits. Given that parties must comply fully with
any jurisdictional discovery orders lest sanctions be imposed (including the determination
that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist), parties and counsel would be well advised to consider
the issues before making a motion to contest jurisdiction. At that point, it is too late to
change one‟s mind, and the court‟s determination on jurisdiction will be given res judicata
effect.132
This is not to say that non-appearance is warranted in all circumstances. Some
litigants may believe that a limited appearance to contest jurisdiction is the preferred
alternative because there is a strong possibility that they can prevail on a motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens (the Sinochem rule). Others may be willing to take the risk of a
limited appearance because they believe that the plaintiff will be unable to make out a case
for jurisdictional discovery and they prefer to obtain a definitive ruling on jurisdiction. Either
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way, the client must make the decision in full knowledge of both the law and the facts of the
case.
As the above suggests, it is impossible to make blanket statements about how to
proceed with a jurisdictional objection in the abstract, since each case will turn on its own
individual facts. What is likely, however, is that many parties are currently failing to
undertake these sorts of analyses at the proper time – ie, prior to entering a limited
appearance – because of a lack of appreciation for the role that jurisdictional discovery plays
in US federal courts. For years, foreign litigants have been surprised by this highly
exceptional procedural device. Now, however, parties and counsel can approach
transnational litigation in US federal courts with a full understanding of the scope and
availability of jurisdictional discovery, and the role it plays in US federal practice.
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